Sabarimala 9 Judges Bench Hearing – April 7, 2026
The Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, commenced his submissions by stating that the Union Government supports the review petitions against the 2018 Sabarimala judgment. He submitted that the earlier judgment requires reconsideration as it approached religious practices through a narrow and modern lens, without adequately accounting for the diversity and complexity of Indian religious traditions. His arguments were rooted in the foundational principles laid down in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (Shirur Mutt Case), where Articles 25 and 26 were interpreted together, distinguishing between religious matters under Article 26(b) and administration of property under Article 26(d).
He emphasised that religion has not been defined in the Constitution and therefore cannot be subjected to rigid or straight-jacket definitions. Religion, according to him, is a matter of faith involving the relationship between man and God, including philosophical concepts such as Advaita and the idea of an inner spiritual self. It includes not only beliefs but also rituals, ceremonies, observances and practices, extending even to aspects such as food, clothing and daily conduct. Traditional practices (anishtanas) were highlighted as examples of practices that cannot be questioned by courts on grounds of logic or rationality.
The Solicitor General stressed the internal plurality of religions, particularly Hinduism, which he described as having no single authority, text, or uniform set of practices. He referred to various traditions such as Vedas, Agamas and Puranas, and even philosophical schools like the Charvak Darshan to demonstrate that Hinduism accommodates both believers and non-believers. He further pointed out that other religions such as Islam and Christianity also contain internal diversity, with different denominations such as Shia and Sunni within Islam, and Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox traditions within Christianity. This plurality, according to him, requires the Court to avoid applying uniform standards to all religious practices .
He then addressed the concept of religious denomination, relying on Shirur Mutt to explain that denominations are identified by a common faith, organisation and name. He submitted that Hinduism consists of multiple sects and sub-sects founded by religious teachers such as Shankaracharya, Madhvacharya and Ramanujacharya, and that these sects can qualify as denominations. Groups such as Shaivites and Vaishnavites, and institutions like the Ashta Maths of Udupi, were cited as examples. He further emphasised that Article 26 protects not only denominations but also any “section thereof,” meaning that even groups that are not separate religions but follow distinct traditions are entitled to protection .
The Solicitor General argued that courts must not impose narrow definitions of denomination, as doing so would “compress” the diversity of Indian religions. He illustrated this by referring to places of worship such as Shirdi, Tirupati, Ajmer Dargah and Nizamuddin Dargah, where followers from different faiths participate while still forming identifiable sections with distinct practices. He submitted that even such sections are entitled to protection under Article 26.
A central aspect of his argument was the limitation of judicial review in matters of religion. He contended that courts lack the “spiritual supremacy” or expertise required to determine religious practices or interpret scriptures. He cautioned against the use of rationality, modernity or scientific temper as standards to evaluate faith, arguing that religion is based on belief rather than logic. He submitted that the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine leads courts into theological adjudication, which is beyond their institutional competence, and that essentiality must be determined from the perspective of the religious community itself.
The Solicitor General also examined the drafting history of the Constitution, particularly Article 25. He pointed out that the original draft referred to “religious worship,” which was later changed to “religious practice” following objections from members such as Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Hansa Mehta. This change, he argued, was intended to broaden the scope of protection to include practices beyond formal worship, such as processions and rituals outside temples. He cited examples like Ganpati immersion to illustrate that religious practice extends beyond acts of worship.
He further reinterpreted the phrase “all persons are equally entitled” under Article 25, arguing that it was introduced in April 1947 in the context of communal tensions during Partition. According to him, the phrase was intended to ensure inter-religious equality and secularism, preventing any one religion from claiming superiority over another, rather than serving as a guarantee of gender equality. He submitted that issues of gender equality are separately addressed under Articles 14 and 15.
The Solicitor General emphasised that Article 26 is a standalone provision guaranteeing autonomy to religious denominations, subject only to public order, morality and health. He highlighted that Article 26(b) protects the right to manage religious affairs, which includes determining who may participate in religious practices. At the same time, Article 25(2)(b) enables laws opening temples to all classes of Hindus as a measure of social reform. This creates a constitutional tension that must be resolved through harmonious construction.
In this context, he relied on Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore to argue that Articles 25 and 26 must be read together. He submitted that while temple entry rights should be liberally construed, they are not absolute and cannot completely override denominational rights. If Article 25(2)(b) is interpreted in a manner that extinguishes Article 26(b), it would render denominational autonomy meaningless. Conversely, Article 26(b) cannot be treated as absolute to the extent of excluding all members of the public. Therefore, both provisions must be balanced.
He invoked the principles of harmonious construction and proportionality, arguing that neither Article 25 nor Article 26 should be interpreted in a way that nullifies the other. Any restriction imposed under Article 25(2)(b) must be proportionate and should not destroy the denominational character of an institution. The rights of the public and the rights of denominations must coexist, and the balance between them must be determined based on the facts of each case.
The Solicitor General also addressed the concept of constitutional morality, arguing that it was originally intended to guide the conduct of constitutional functionaries when the law is silent. He criticised its use as a standard of judicial review to strike down religious practices, stating that such an approach introduces subjectivity and departs from the original intent of the framers.
He further submitted that the attributes of a deity, such as the character of Lord Ayyappa as a Naishtika Brahmachari, are matters of faith and cannot be subjected to judicial review. Courts, according to him, cannot “reform” a deity or question the beliefs of devotees regarding the nature of the deity.
Finally, he addressed procedural concerns, particularly whether persons unconnected with a faith can challenge its practices through public interest litigation. He suggested that such challenges may lack proper standing and that disputes relating to religious practices should ideally be examined through appropriate evidentiary processes rather than abstract constitutional adjudication.
He concluded by reiterating that the law is well settled: religion includes practices and observances; denominations and sections thereof have the right to manage their religious affairs; judicial review in matters of faith must be limited; and Articles 25 and 26 must be interpreted together in a manner that preserves both religious autonomy and the constitutional framework without allowing one provision to override the other.
