Introduction

The hearing before the Constitution Bench on April 7, 2026, in the Sabarimala review matter marked a significant moment in the ongoing constitutional discourse on religious freedom, denominational rights, and judicial review. The Solicitor General of India, Tushar Mehta, presented extensive submissions supporting the review of the 2018 Sabarimala judgment. His arguments delved into constitutional interpretation, religious plurality, and the limits of judicial intervention in matters of faith.

This article provides a detailed and structured account of the submissions made, preserving every aspect of the original hearing while presenting it in a reader-friendly blog format.

Submissions of the Solicitor General

Support for Review of the 2018 Judgment

The Solicitor General commenced his submissions by affirming that the Union Government supports the review petitions against the 2018 Sabarimala judgment. He argued that the earlier judgment requires reconsideration as it approached religious practices through a narrow and modern lens, without adequately accounting for the diversity and complexity of Indian religious traditions.

His arguments were rooted in foundational constitutional principles laid down in the Shirur Mutt Case, where Articles 25 and 26 were interpreted together, distinguishing between:

• Religious matters under Article 26(b), and
• Administration of property under Article 26(d)

Understanding Religion Under the Constitution

Absence of a Definition

The Solicitor General emphasised that the Constitution does not define religion, and therefore it cannot be confined within rigid or straight-jacket definitions.

Scope of Religion

According to his submissions, religion includes:

• Faith and belief
• Relationship between man and God
• Philosophical concepts such as Advaita
• Rituals, ceremonies, observances
• Practices involving food, clothing, and daily conduct

He highlighted that traditional practices (anishtanas) cannot be questioned by courts based on logic or rationality.

Plurality of Religions

Hinduism as a Pluralistic System

The Solicitor General stressed the internal plurality of Hinduism, noting that it:

• Has no single authority or central text
• Includes Vedas, Agamas, and Puranas
• Accommodates diverse philosophical schools, including Charvak Darshan

Plurality Across Religions

He further noted that:

• Islam includes Shia and Sunni traditions
• Christianity includes Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox denominations

This plurality, he argued, requires courts to avoid imposing uniform standards on religious practices.

Concept of Religious Denomination

Definition and Characteristics

Relying on the Shirur Mutt Case, the Solicitor General explained that a religious denomination is identified by:

• A common faith
• A common organisation
• A distinctive name

Examples of Denominations

He cited:

• Sects founded by Shankaracharya, Madhvacharya, and Ramanujacharya
• Shaivites and Vaishnavites
• Institutions like the Ashta Maths of Udupi

He emphasised that Article 26 protects not only denominations but also any “section thereof.”

Protection of Sections Within Religions

Broad Interpretation of Article 26

The Solicitor General argued that even groups that are not separate religions but follow distinct traditions qualify for protection.

Illustrative Examples

He referred to places of worship such as:

• Shirdi
• Tirupati
• Ajmer Dargah
• Nizamuddin Dargah

These, he argued, demonstrate that identifiable sections with distinct practices exist even within shared spaces of worship.

Limits of Judicial Review in Religious Matters

Lack of Judicial Expertise

The Solicitor General contended that courts lack:

• Spiritual authority
• Theological expertise

Critique of Rationality-Based Review

He cautioned against evaluating religion using:

• Rationality
• Modernity
• Scientific temper

Religion, he argued, is based on belief rather than logic.

Criticism of the Essential Religious Practices Doctrine

Judicial Overreach

He submitted that the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine:

• Leads courts into theological adjudication
• Exceeds institutional competence

Determination of Essentiality

He argued that essentiality must be determined:

• From the perspective of the religious community
• Not by judicial interpretation

Drafting History of Article 25

Shift from “Worship” to “Practice”

The Solicitor General highlighted that:

• The original draft referred to “religious worship”
• It was later changed to “religious practice”

This change followed objections from members such as:

• Rajkumari Amrit Kaur
• Hansa Mehta

Broader Scope of Protection

This amendment expanded constitutional protection to include:

• Rituals
• Processions
• Practices outside temples

He cited Ganpati immersion as an example.

Interpretation of “All Persons Are Equally Entitled”

Historical Context

The phrase was introduced in April 1947 during:

• Communal tensions surrounding Partition

Purpose of the Phrase

According to the Solicitor General:

• It ensures inter-religious equality
• It promotes secularism
• It prevents religious superiority

He clarified that:

• It is not a guarantee of gender equality
• Gender equality is addressed under Articles 14 and 15

Interplay Between Articles 25 and 26

Autonomy Under Article 26

Article 26 guarantees:

• Autonomy to religious denominations
• Subject only to public order, morality, and health

Temple Entry Under Article 25(2)(b)

Article 25(2)(b) allows:

• Laws enabling temple entry for all classes of Hindus
• Measures of social reform

Need for Harmonious Construction

Balancing Competing Rights

Relying on Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, the Solicitor General argued that:

• Articles 25 and 26 must be read together
• Neither provision should override the other

Key Principles

• Temple entry rights are not absolute
• Denominational rights cannot be extinguished
• Both must coexist

Doctrine of Proportionality

Ensuring Balance

He invoked:

• Harmonious construction
• Proportionality

Core Argument

Any restriction under Article 25(2)(b):

• Must be proportionate
• Must not destroy denominational identity

Critique of Constitutional Morality

Original Purpose

The Solicitor General argued that constitutional morality:

• Was meant to guide constitutional functionaries
• Applies when law is silent

Objection to Judicial Use

He criticised its use:

• As a tool for judicial review
• For striking down religious practices

He argued this introduces subjectivity.

Deity and Matters of Faith

Attributes of the Deity

He submitted that:

• The character of Lord Ayyappa as a Naishtika Brahmachari is a matter of faith

Limits of Judicial Intervention

Courts cannot:

• Reform a deity
• Question beliefs about divine attributes

Procedural Concerns and PILs

Question of Standing

The Solicitor General raised concerns about:

• Whether persons unconnected with a faith can challenge its practices

Suggested Approach

He suggested:

• Such disputes should involve proper evidentiary processes
• Not abstract constitutional adjudication

Conclusion of Submissions

The Solicitor General concluded that the legal position is well established:

• Religion includes practices and observances
• Denominations and their sections have protected rights
• Judicial review in matters of faith must be limited
• Articles 25 and 26 must be interpreted harmoniously

He emphasised that:

• Neither provision should override the other
• The constitutional framework must preserve religious autonomy while maintaining balance

Final Thought

The submissions made on April 7, 2026, underscore a deeper constitutional tension between individual rights, religious autonomy, and judicial authority. By advocating restraint in judicial intervention and emphasising the pluralistic nature of Indian religion, the Solicitor General has reignited a fundamental debate: how should courts navigate faith in a constitutional democracy?

The outcome of this case will likely have far-reaching implications—not only for Sabarimala but for the broader relationship between law and religion in India.